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SPATIAL METAPHORS OF TIME IN ROMAN CULTURE 
 
ABSTRACT 
As cognitive structures that capture patterns of sensorimotor experience, image schemas and their 
metaphorical interpretations not only deliver meaning in Latin’s semantic system, but also organize 
other forms of Roman symbolic representation. This paper builds on Maurizio Bettini’s analysis 
of Latin’s metaphorical expression of time in terms of linear spatial relations by tracing the 
structuring effects of these metaphors on other aspects of Roman social practice, including its 
artistic practice. As I argue, apart from their linguistic manifestations, these metaphors motivate 
the “axial” configurations of certain socially instituted genealogical representations, as well as 
provide principles of organization for the construction and decoration of material objects. 
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As a broadly interpretive discipline that seeks to shed light on the meanings elaborated by members 
of Greek and Roman society in linguistic and other forms of representation, classical studies has 
long been interested in the relationship between words (or, more narrowly, texts) and images. This 
interest has developed in part as a result of disciplinary history: classical archaeology and art 
history first grew as branches of philology and often have been marked by a strongly textual 
orientation.1 It also arises in part because, as Jás Elsner reminds us, the ancients themselves did 
not always neatly distinguish words from images:2 in Greek, for instance, the root of γραφή, 
γράφειν is ambiguous between “writing” and “drawing” and even “painting” (cf., e.g., Her. Hist. 
2.182, εἰκόνας ἑωυτοῦ γραφῇ εἰκασμένην, “A likeness of himself represented in painting”). Lately, 
special attention has been paid to the ways in which words and images appear to express analogous 
meanings:3 A certain scenic description in a literary text—say, that of the maenads in Euripides’ 
Bacchae (680‒713) or of the temple of Apollo at Delphi in Ion (184‒236)—can be said to be “like 
a picture” in evoking highly vivid images or even a specific work of art.4 Or a certain configuration 
of elements in a visual image can be said to capture meanings akin to a certain literary trope or 
even a specific figure of speech.5 Very often, the visual has actually been understood in “linguistic” 
terms: Claude Bérard in fact took the structure of language as an explicit model for analyzing 
Greek art in terms of syntactic combinations and paradigmatic substitutions.6 Similarly, Tonio 
Hölscher suggested that Roman art be treated as a “semantic system” (semantisches System) 
conveyed through a “language of images” (Bildsprache).7 
Given this strong disciplinary interest in the relationship between word and image, the study 
of metaphor suggests itself as a fruitful area of research. Recent developments in the so-called 
“second generation” cognitive sciences show it to be a particularly promising subject, as it has 
been suggested that metaphor may function as a key node where linguistic and visual signification 
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intersect. A central claim of theories of “embodied” cognition and language is that much of 
people’s ability to make sense of and communicate about their experience is delivered by 
conceptual structures that emerge from the interaction of brain, body, and environment. In 
cognitive linguistics, the meanings of many words are taken to correspond—either directly or 
indirectly through figurative interpretation—to recurring patterns of sensorimotor experience or 
“image schemas.” However, because image schemas are taken to operate at a very general level of 
understanding—and so may motivate symbolic representations of many different kinds—in my 
view their study affords the possibility of bringing together linguistic semantics with the 
interpretation of works of art (not to mention other forms of imaginative expression) under a 
unified cultural semiotics.8 To illustrate what this might look like, in this paper I re-analyze and 
extend Maurizio Bettini’s findings on Latin’s expression of time in terms of metaphors of 
horizontal and vertical linear relations by tracing the structuring effects of these metaphors on other 
aspects of Roman society’s symbolic activity, including its artistic practice. Apart from their 
linguistic manifestations, these metaphors, I propose, not only motivate the specific axial 
configurations of certain socially instituted genealogical representations, but also provide 
principles of topographical organization for the construction and decoration of material objects, as 
well as the mechanism of their interpretation. 
 
I. LATIN’S SPATIAL METAPHORS OF TIME. 
Theories of embodiment developed in the cognitive sciences posit that human meaning making—
whether in language or any other form of symbolic representation—depends crucially on the 
character of human bodily engagement with the world.9 Traditional (formal) philosophical and 
linguistic semantics defines concepts in terms of “necessary and sufficient” features represented 
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in the mind as language-like symbols and governed by syntactic principles. Proponents of the 
embodied view of meaning argue, instead, that categorization is grounded in humanly determined 
perceptual, interactional, functional, and purposive properties.10 Thus, many categories are “ad-
hoc” or “goal-derived” categories constructed on the basis of prior experience or context-induced 
value judgments (“things one takes on a camping trip,” “things to save from a burning house”),11 
or out of richly imagined concrete scenes: even a seemingly highly stable taxonomy such as fruit, 
for instance, is probably not understood as something like “any sweet and fleshy product of a plant 
that contains seeds and can be eaten,” but constructed on the fly by scanning memories of the 
produce section of a grocery store.12 Or consider the category of what is fake. Fake negates certain 
functional properties of the concepts it modifies, while preserving others: for instance, a fake gun 
looks like a real gun (perceptual), can be handled like one (interactional), and can be used in some 
of the same situations as one (purposive); however, it cannot perform the primary functions of a 
gun (killing) and was not designed to do so. 
In many cases, scholars now claim that the meanings of words are actually defined 
imagistically or, to use the term of art, “image-schematically”—an image schema being, as Mark 
Johnson writes, “a recurring dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programs 
that gives coherence and structure to our experience.”13 In this theory, image schemas are highly 
abstract structures of cognition that are correlates of (because dependent on the same neural 
architecture as) sensory and motor experience, and are thus susceptible of visual and kinesthetic 
transformation “in the mind’s eye”—rotation, scanning, clustering or segmentation, 
superimposition, path or end-point focus, following a trajectory, reflexivity and so forth —as well 
as combination into more complex scenarios.14 Cognitive linguists argue that image schemas may 
also be metaphorically interpreted as a support to abstract conceptualization, projecting conceptual 
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structure and content from more readily comprehensible concrete domains to those less grounded 
in physical experience.16 In this way, image schemas are said to provide the inferential patterns 
that motivate the range of senses typically characterizing the meanings of words.17 
Consider the preposition dē. As I have argued, its meaning cannot be “out of” or “away from” 
(let alone “down from”) expressed in such propositional format.18 In the idiom dē tergo and 
expressions like aram . . . dē qua pariens arbore nixa dea est (Ov. Her. 21.99–100), its sense 
actually seems to include motion toward a location (the back, the tree). In etiam si cecidit de genu 
pugnat (Sen. Dial. 1.2.6) the preposition must be interpreted in the sense not simply of “from,” but 
more specifically of “up from.” Even if we take dē’s meaning to be some very general notion of 
separation, its sense in deligare and devincire (“bind (together)”), where it implies the narrowing 
of physical space between two things, show this to be inadequate. To explain dē’s full range of 
senses, we must instead take its meaning to be an image schema that portrays two bounded regions 
and a trajector’s motion between these regions. In this way, conventional uses of dē in which the 
preposition designates the source point of something as it moves closer to the position of the 
implied observer, or where the motion is seen as being in a direction away from the observer, can 
be accounted for in terms of naturalistic shifts of perspective over the imagined scenario. 
Moreover, dē’s abstract senses—its ability to denote, e.g., topicality (“about, concerning”), 
genealogical and kinship relations, negation, strengthening, pejoration—can then be explained on 
the basis of regularly occurring metaphors in Latin’s semantic system, whereby the regions are 
interpreted as IDEAS, STATES, and so on. 
Latin speakers’ conceptualization of time exemplifies just this sort of image-schematic 
structuring. If in somewhat different terms, Maurizio Bettini has argued that Latin’s conventional 
ways of talking about time are in fact organized by two metaphors in which temporal relations are 
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conceived through images of one-dimensional linear spatial relations.19 In one metaphor, time is 
imagined as a vertically oriented line and temporal relations are understood in terms of schematic 
images of “above” and “below.” Thus, as examples (1) to (9) illustrate, Latin speakers say that one 
time (a night, a day, a year . . . ) or event (a battle, a crime, a marriage . . . ) is “above (supra)” or 
“higher than (superior)” another to mean that it happened before:20 
(1) quid superiore nocte egeris, “What you did on the previous night” (Cic. Cat. 1.1);  
(2) nonne timuisse . . . non parietes denique ipsos superiorum testis nuptiarum? “Did she 
not fear . . . the very walls, finally, as witnesses of her previous marriage?” (Clu. 
6.15); 
(3) non oblivione amicitiae . . . superioribus temporibus ad te nullas litteras misi, “I have 
not neglected to send you any letters in the past days out of any forgetfulness of our 
friendship” (Fam. 5.17.1);  
(4) milites superioribus proeliis exercitati, “Soldiers trained in previous battles” (Caes. 
BG. 2.20);  
(5) has superioribus diebus refecerat atque omnibus rebus instruxerat, “He had 
completely refitted and rigged these (sc. ships) in the preceding days” (BC. 2.5);  
(6) testimonium conveniens superiori facto, “Evidence fitting the previous act” (Hirt. 
BG. 8.53);  
(7) paulo supra hanc memoriam, “A little before the memory of this generation” (Caes. 
BG. 6.19.5); 
(8) res est praeterea et immensi operis, ut quae supra septingentesimum annum 
repetatur, “My subject involves great labor, to trace back more than seven hundred 
years” (Liv. AUC. 1.pr.4);  
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(9) praetoribus de superioris anni actis referentibus, “The praetors made a motion 
respecting the transactions of the prior year” (Suet. Iul. 23).21 
Conversely, Latin speakers say that a time is “below (infra)” or “lower than (inferior)” another to 
mean it happened after: e.g., 
(10) cum intercalatur inferiores quinque dies duodecimo demuntur mense, “When it (sc. 
February) is intercalated, the last five days are removed from the twelfth month” (Var. 
LL. 6.13); 
(11) non infra superiorem Lycurgum fuit, “He (sc. Homer) was not after the elder 
Lycurgus” (Cic. Brut. 40); 
(12) aetate inferiores paulo quam Iulius, “A little younger in age than Julius” (182); 
(13) erant inferiores quam illorum aetas, “They were younger than those men” (Q. Fr. 
3.5.2);22 
(14) Ciceronis temporibus paulumque infra, “In Cicero’s days and a little later” (Quint. 
IO. 1.7.20); 
(15) transiit ad inferiora tempora . . . cum sentiret neque libere neque vere sibi de 
superioribus tradendi potestatem relictam, “He (sc. Claudius) skipped over to later 
times . . . since he felt that no opening had been left for him to deal freely and truly 
with the previous events” (Suet. Claud. 41.2). 
In other words, Latin’s conventional ways of expressing temporal relations are structured 
systematically by a set of conceptual correspondences according to which ‘BEFORE IS ABOVE’ and 
‘AFTER IS BELOW.’23 These correspondences can be represented as a series of mappings or 
correspondences between the domain of spatial relations and that of time—namely, “a vertical line 
→ time’s progress,” “above, up (on the line) → earlier time, before,” and “below, down (on the 
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line) → later time, after.” They can also be represented graphically as in Figure 1, where the solid 
line represents the vertical axis in three-dimensional coordinate geometry and coordinates “above” 
and “below” represent earlier and later times, respectively.<FIGURE 1: ABOVE/BELOW schema 
underlying Latin’s expressions of temporal relations.> 
In the other metaphor, the time line is imagined as oriented horizontally (as a line extending 
through the body from back to front) and temporal relations are understood in terms of “before” 
and “behind”—in other words, in terms of their relative position “in front of” or “in back of.” 
There are two possibilities. As examples (16) to (22) illustrate, time may be conceived as a 
subject’s movement forward towards the future, times being static points along the trajectory of 
motion towards or to which the subject “goes” or “arrives” or “approaches”: 
(16) adolevit ad eam aetatem, “She has grown up to that age” (Plaut. Cas. 47‒48); 
(17) semper ego usque ad hanc aetatem . . . tuis servivi servitutem imperiis, “Even up to 
this present age, I have always . . . paid all submission to the injunctions” (Trin. 301); 
(18) etsi pervivo usque ad summam aetatem, “Even if I live to the greatest old age” (Plaut. 
Capt. 742); 
(19) pervenisse te ad ultimum aetatis humanae videmus, “We see that you have come 
through to the last moment of a man’s life” (Sen. Brev. vit. 3.2); 
(20) non cunctabitur sapiens ire ad mortem certo gradu, “The wise man will not hesitate 
to meet death with a sure step” (11.2); 
(21) cogita brevitatem huius spatii, per quod citatissimi currimus, “Consider the shortness 
of this space, through which we run so very fast” (Ep. mor. 99.7); 
(22) qui proxime praetextati aetatem accedet, “who will soon approach the age of young 
adulthood” (Iust. Dig. 43.30.3.6). 
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In this subject-moving image, the subject’s position corresponds to “now” and a time’s being 
“in front of” the subject means it is in the future and its being “in back of” the subject means 
it has already occurred in the past. This can be represented graphically by Figure 2, where the 
solid line represents time as the horizontal axis in a three-dimensional coordinate space and 
the arrow represents motion along this axis (and thus, metaphorically, temporal 
progression).<FIGURE 2: FRONT/BACK schema in subject-moving expressions.> It is 
important to recognize here that PAST and FUTURE on the time line are defined relative to ego’s 
bodily orientation. That is, according to the conceptual correspondences set up by the mappings 
of this metaphor, ‘THE PAST IS BEHIND’ and ‘THE FUTURE IS IN FRONT (OF EGO)’.24 This is why 
(usque) ad—literally, “(all the way) to(ward)” —has the figurative meaning it does: though ad 
can indicate motion conceivably in any direction (as, e.g., in Ov. Fast. 6.786, ad stellas aliquis 
talia verba iacit, it includes the notion of motion upward through contextual modulation), in 
human embodied experience, movement tends to occur in the direction we are facing. In 
metaphorically projecting spatial dimensionality onto the conception of time, ego therefore 
moves forward along the time line in the direction of (ad) specific time-points in the future. 
This is why in (23) to (26), the adverb porro has the temporal meaning “in the future”: what is 
literally “straight on, forward, onward” relative to ego on the time line is metaphorically yet to 
occur: e.g., 
(23) quid mi hic adfers quam ob rem exspectem aut sperem porro non fore? “What 
are you offering me, why I should expect or hope it will not happen in the future?” 
(Ter. Phorm. 1025); 
(24) me sollicitum . . . esse atque porro fore, “That I was disturbed and would be for 
the future” (Cat. Orat. fr. 39); 
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(25) ni te perdite amo atque amare porro / omnes sum assidue paratus annos, 
“Unless I love you madly and am ready to love you in the future without stopping 
through all the years” (Catull. Carm. 45.3‒4); 
(26) neque quemquam alium diuinare posse, quid in animo Celtiberi haberent aut 
porro habituri essent, “Nor could anyone else guess what the Celtiberi intended, or 
what they were going to intend in the future” (Liv. AUC. 40.36.2). 
This is also why one “looks backward” (respicere) to past events in Latin, as demonstrated by, e.g., 
(27) cum respicias inmensi temporis omne / praeteritum spatium, “When you look 
back at the whole passed-by space of immeasurable time” (Luc. RN. 3.854‒55); 
(28) nam quoad longissime potest mens mea respicere spatium praeteriti temporis, 
“For as far as my mind can look back at the space of bygone time” (Cic. Arch. 1); 
(29) nec enim illis uacat praeterita respicere, “Nor do they have leisure to look back 
at what has gone before” (Sen. Brev. vit. 10.2); 
(30) nemo . . . libenter se in praeteritum retorquet, “No one gladly . . . twists himself 
back toward the past” (10.3); 
(31) cras vel atra / nube polum pater occupato / vel sole puro; non tamen inritum / 
quodcumque retro est efficiet neque / diffinget infectumque reddet / quod fugiens 
semel hora vexit. “Let Jupiter tomorrow with black / clouds preempt the sky / or 
bright sun: yet he will not cross out / whatever is behind or redivise / and make 
undone what once / the fleeting hour has brought” (Hor. Carm. 3.29.43‒48); 
(32) iam post terga reliquit sexaginta annos, “Behind his back, he has left sixty 
years” (Juv. Sat. 13.16);25 
and why, equally, one “looks forward” (providere or prospicere) to future events: 
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(33) si quae eventura sunt provideant, “For if anything is to come out, let them 
foresee” (Pac. Trag. fr. 407); 
(34) quod ego . . . sensi atque providi, “which I . . . perceived and foresaw” (Cic. 
Vat. 2.4);  
(35) in hoc enim fallimur, quod mortem prospicimus, “For in this we are deceived, 
that we look ahead to death” (Sen. Ep. mor. 1.2.3). 
Alternatively, times can be seen as moving together from the future toward past from the 
perspective of a subject who occupies a fixed position on the time line. Thus, as examples (36) 
through (43) show, times are said to “come (venire),” “draw near (appropinquare),” “approach 
(accedere, appetere),” “come up (incidere)” and even “flow,” “fall away,” or “slip by” a person: 
(36) iam appetit meridies, “Already midday approaches” (Plaut. Most. 636); 
(37) quasi vero tempus dandi muneris non valde appropinquaret, “As if in reality the 
time for the exhibition was not drawing very near” (Cic. Sul. 54); 
(38) non numquam eius modi tempora incidunt, “Sometimes occasions like this come 
upon us” (Fin. 1.32); 
(39) quo plus sibi aetatis accederet, “The more old age approaches on him” (De orat. 
254); 
(40) veniet . . . aetas, “The age will come” (Verg. Aen. 1.283); 
(41) multa ferunt anni venientes commoda secum, “The years coming bring many 
advantages with them” (Hor. Ars 175); 
(42) lenior et melior fis accedente senecta? “Do you become softer and better when old 
age approaches?” (Hor. Ep. 2.2.211); 
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(43) tempora labuntur, tacitisque senescimus annis, “Times slip by and we grow old 
with silent years” (Ov. Fast. 6.771). 
In this time-moving image, events are reified, assigned a definite front and back (very likely 
through a projection of the human “body set”: cf. Todes 2001), and oriented according to the time 
line’s directionality. This can be represented as in Figure 3, where the solid line again represents 
time as the horizontal axis, and the circles labeled x, y, and z represent distinct times whose 
movement with the time line constitutes temporal progression.<FIGURE 3: FRONT/BACK schema 
in time-moving expressions.> Consequently, according to the conceptual mappings of this 
metaphor, one time’s or event’s being “in front of (ante)” another means it happened before and 
its being “behind (post)” means it happened after (as in the Figure time x is in front of and therefore 
earlier than time y, and time z is behind and therefore later than time y, from ego’s point of view)—
irrespective of whether these temporal relations belong to a future or a past time (i.e., ego’s position 
does not necessarily correspond to “now”). That is, metaphorically speaking, ‘BEFORE IS IN FRONT’ 
and ‘AFTER IS BEHIND’, as exemplified by: 
(44) ante lucem a portu me praemisisti domum, “Before daybreak, you sent me from the 
harbor home before you” (Plaut. Am. 602); 
(45) ante solem occasum, “Before sunset” (Epid. 144); 
(46) ante vesperum, “Before evening” (Bacch. 1029); 
(47) ante brumam, “Before winter” (Ter. Phorm. 709); 
(48) ante hanc urbem conditam, “Before the founding of this city” (Cic. TD. 5.3.7);  
and by: 
(49) qui foret post illa natus, “Who was born after these things” (Enn. Trag. fr. 67 
Vahlens); 
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(50) post id cum lassus fueris, “After that, when you’re tired out” (Plaut. Cas. 130); 
(51) eum . . . numquam post illa vidi, “I never saw him after that” (Curc. 529); 
(52) aliquot post menses, “After some months” (Cic. Rosc. Am. 128); 
(53) post M. Brutum proconsulem, “After the proconsulate of M. Brutus” (Phil. 
2.38.97); 
(54) Socrates Critoni dixit sibi post tertium diem esse moriendum, “Socrates said to 
Crito that after three days’ time he would have to die” (Div. 1.52). 26 
 
II. LATIN’S SPATIAL METAPHORS AS A “FOLK” MODEL OF TIME. 
Evidence indicates that alongside these LINEAR metaphors a number of other metaphors 
contributed to Latin speakers’ understanding of time. For instance, figurative usage of the verb 
impendere with aevum (“age, era”), vita (“life”), biennium (“two-year period”), and other words 
denoting temporal intervals implies Latin speakers could sometimes conceive of time as something 
to “weigh out” and thus (because in Roman society payments were originally made with weighed 
metals) “spend” as money. Perhaps Seneca (Brev. vit. 11.2) elaborates this image most fully when 
he describes the time of one’s life as something that cannot be “transferred as a debt” (delegatur) 
or “lessened by prodigality” (largitione detrahitur), but that is to be viewed instead “entirely as 
income” (tota . . . in reditu est). Similarly, when Ovid speaks of “voracious time” (Met. 15.234, 
edax tempus) and again of “voracious oldness” (Met. 15.872, edax vetustas), or Seneca writes that 
“greedy time devours us” (Troad. 400, tempus nos avidum devorat), this implies Latin speakers 
could also conceive of time in terms of (animalistic?) eating. Expressions like Vergil’s volvendis 
mensibus (Aen. 1.269), Lucretius’ volventia lustra (RN. 5.928), and Ovid’s volvens annus (Met. 
5.565) indicate they could conceptualize time in cyclic terms as well. In this light, the overall 
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system of metaphors converging on Latin speakers’ conceptualization of time probably resembles 
something like Figure 4.<FIGURE 4: Metaphors converging on Latin speakers’ conceptualization 
of time.> 
Why does this range of different images converge on Latin speakers’ metaphorical 
conceptualization of time? Cognitive linguists argue that where a concept is defined by several 
distinct metaphors, these metaphors typically work together to produce a coherent understanding 
of that concept’s various aspects.27 While the metaphors may fail to provide a consistent image to 
conceptualization, nevertheless they tend to fit together as a system, each metaphor delivering an 
understanding of some dimension of the metaphorically defined concept not covered, or only 
partially covered, by the others. Just so, the “weighing out” metaphor maps Latin speakers’ 
knowledge about the function of money onto time, so that time can be assigned a value and treated 
like any other resource or market commodity.28 The “devouring” metaphor maps knowledge about 
how hungry animals eat their prey onto the time, to help convey something about its destructive 
effects: namely, that it acts quickly, ferociously, and without mercy on human beings. The 
“revolving” metaphor maps what is most likely an astronomical image of the apparent revolution 
of the sun, moon, and stars in the sky onto time, to capture the perception that time is ordered by 
continuously repeated temporal units (days, months, seasons, years).29 The vertical and horizontal 
metaphors, meanwhile, project paired spatial images onto time as a means of imposing a basic 
scalar structure on the otherwise undifferentiated flow of time. 
Still, the sorts of meanings delivered by Latin’s MONEY, CYCLE, and EATING metaphors of time 
need to be distinguished from those of the LINEAR metaphors. To begin with, these metaphors 
involve the projection of conceptual content that tends to be relatively rich in structure and 
imagistically complex: correspondingly, the meanings they make available to Latin speakers are 
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highly particular and so contextually circumscribed. Furthermore, they are largely “one-shot” 
metaphors that map isolated images onto the conceptualization of (specific aspects of) time and 
consequently lack widespread effects in Latin’s semantic system. For instance, while it is possible 
to find a word like orbis (“circle”) referring to the repetitive nature of temporal events,30 it does 
not seem to be idiomatic to speak in Latin of, say, time’s “circumference” or of an “arc” of time: 
the image of “revolving” times may in fact be dependent on a Greek poetic metaphor.31 Similarly, 
we do not find Latin speakers conventionally referring to temporal events as “coins,” nor to time’s 
“jaws” or “fangs.” At the same time, the images of “weighing out” time and of time that “devours” 
are specialized subcases of metaphors that operate at a high order of semantic structure: the former 
characterizes a very general concept of devoting a large amount of some (literal or figurative) 
resource to an activity, while the latter defines the destructive effects of any (again literal or 
figurative) force. 
The LINEAR metaphors, by contrast, deliver images to Latin speakers’ conceptualization of time 
that are structurally and imagistically minimal: that is, ABOVE, BELOW, FRONT and BACK all 
represent structures of meaning that depict highly schematic spatial configurations consisting of a 
limited number of elements largely undefined as to their conceptual content. They also involve 
pairings of images that are systematically related, in the sense that ABOVE and BELOW, FRONT and 
BACK are contrastive images whose opposition in understanding emerges naturally from human 
bodily experience.32 Because of gravity’s pervasive operation on our bodies and objects within 
terrestrial environments, we experience things as being “up” or “down” in relation to one another. 
Likewise, because the sensorimotor capacities through which we engage with our environments 
tend to be localized on one side of the human body, we understand ourselves as functionally 
asymmetrical also on the horizontal axis: we understand ourselves, that is, as having a definite 
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“front” and “back.” Accordingly, in being interpreted metaphorically of time, these images 
characterize a very general understanding of this domain—in effect delineating time as an aspect 
of experience and endowing temporality with a relational structure—and so organize a great 
portion of Latin speakers’ talk about time over different authors and genres, different periods of 
the language, and different levels of the linguistic code. 
This is not to suggest that the horizontal and vertical images of time are in any way fungible 
in Latin.33 While serving the same basic function, their meaning differs in at least one important 
respect. Through the metaphorical mapping of images of ABOVE/BELOW spatial relations onto the 
conceptualization of time, temporal relations in this image emerge as a difference of values 
inherent in the time scale itself. The vertical metaphor thus focuses on a subject-neutral or 
“allocentric” view of temporal relations. Through the mapping of FRONT/BACK orientation onto 
times, temporal relations in this image are instead construed always relative to a specific 
perspective (even if no commitment is made as to the location of a subject’s now)—the horizontal 
metaphor thus focusing on a more subject-oriented or “egocentric” view. In this way, Latin’s 
LINEAR metaphors of time appear to work together to capture the very likely universal human 
experience of time both as something that exists independently of and prior to any individual 
subjectivity (that is, we understand that time is not defined by any one human existence) and as 
something inextricably bound up with that subjectivity (still, we experience time as ordered 
fundamentally by our own human concerns and indeed as something we can personally “have”).34 
Though these images, which are inconsistent in that one construes time along a vertical and the 
other along a horizontal axis, probably would not suffice for rigorous scientific theorizing, as a 
system they nevertheless constitute a workable “folk” model apparently sufficient to Latin 
speakers’ reasoning and communicating about temporal relations for most everyday purposes.35 
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III. AND AS A “CULTURAL” MODEL. 
Of course, Latin is not unique in recruiting spatial imagery—and indeed images of horizontal and 
vertical spatial relations very particularly—towards the metaphorical conceptualization of time. 
Cognitive linguists have described this as a feature of many—and, what’s more, many 
typologically unrelated—languages, even if the relative incidence of each image varies from 
language to language.36 In English and German, for example, the horizontal metaphor is robustly 
evidenced and the vertical metaphor is extremely attenuated,37 while French preserves the latter in 
expressions like haut moyen âge (“early,” literally “high middle age”) and basse antiquité (“late,” 
literally “low antiquity”).38 Similar situations obtain in Hindi, Sesotho, Turkish, Hawaiian, many 
South American languages, Japanese, and Mandarin Chinese—where it is possible to find the 
spatial terms shàng (“up”) and xià (“down”) as well as qián (“front”) and hòu (“back”) used in 
time expressions to signify “last” and “next,” respectively.39 Linear spatialization thus appears to 
be a widely distributed, and perhaps universal, aspect of human conceptualizations of time.40 If 
Latin is fairly typical of the world’s languages in this respect, what possible cultural significance 
do its metaphors of time have, then? Its conforming to a pattern of metaphorical meaning common 
to many languages and cultures hardly seems to lend itself to the characterization of what is 
distinctive about Roman culture. 
In my view, linguistic metaphors become anthropologically revealing when they appear to be 
reflected in configurations of culture at large—when they are “made real,” that is, in a society’s 
institutions, practices, material objects. Correspondences that Maurizio Bettini has pointed out 
between Latin’s time metaphors and certain socially instituted genealogical representations 
therefore seem telling. He has argued that the vertical metaphor of time can in fact be detected in 
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the form of the aristocratic stemma, where the understanding of temporal relations in terms of 
“above” and “below” is given concrete realization in the spatial arrangement of imagines of family 
members of different generations, with members of older generations located “above” and those 
of younger generations located “below.” Thus, he writes, “the ‘high’ character attributed to earlier 
time and the ‘low’ character attributed to later time,” “find a precise correspondence and 
illustration in the structure of the genealogical stemma.”41 The horizontal metaphor, meanwhile, 
can be seen to give shape to the pompa funebris, where actors impersonating family members of 
older generations come physically “before” and younger generations “after” in the processional 
line escorting the deceased’s body. In other words, “‘Before’ is where the founder comes . . . 
‘Behind’ . . . follow the more recent ancestors . . . and last of all, farther behind than everyone, 
comes the latest member of the line to die”.42 
I would add that what likely accounts for the specific axial orientations of these forms of 
genealogical representation—namely, the verticality of the stemma and the horizontality of the 
funeral procession—is the “main meaning focus” of each metaphor.43 What I mean is that, 
symbolically speaking, the stemma is “about” the organization of a kinship group as it occurs 
irrespective of any one individual—and thus its representation of temporal relations in spatial 
terms of “above” and “below” finds motivation in the more allocentric construal of time provided 
by the vertical image. The funeral procession is instead about the position of single individual 
within the generational order—so the horizontal image, which captures a more egocentric view of 
time, provides a basis for its representation of temporal relations in terms of “before” and “behind.” 
Put differently, in the stemma, the ordering of generations is arranged vertically because in this 
case the network of family relations (or a portion of it) is meant to be represented without reference 
to the viewpoint of any person within this network, and the vertical metaphor engenders just such 
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a perspective-neutral understanding of temporality. In the funeral procession, the ordering of 
generations is arranged horizontally because attention is meant to be called to the position of a 
single family member within this ordering, and the horizontal metaphor captures this sort of 
perspective-specific view of temporal relations. 44 
Now, in making such a claim I may seem to be privileging abstract conceptual principles over 
other more concrete physical considerations that may also (or in greater measure) constrain forms 
of symbolic expression. After all, if the stemma consists of imagines displayed on a wall, is it not 
natural that the order of generations should be represented in terms of vertical spatial relations? 
Likewise, given the reality of parading through streets (especially narrow Roman ones), how else 
could this order be represented if not in terms of horizontal relations? More than anything, basic 
physics seems to shape the unfolding of these symbolic forms along a particular spatial axis. This 
largely misses the point, however. Of course, objects arrayed on a vertical surface must be located 
some “above” and some “below.” Of course, bodies traversing a horizontal surface must come 
some “before” and some “after.” Yet this does not explain why, in the first place, Latin speakers 
should have found a procession to be an effective representation of generational ordering in the 
perspective-specific context of a funeral, or why they should have considered the stemma most 
suitable to providing a deictically-neutral view of kinship relations. What makes each of these 
forms a fitting choice in context is, as I see it, the operation of these distinct metaphors of time and 
the particular construal of temporal relations that they severally engender. If the choice seems 
natural and intuitive, it is only because our culture largely shares these metaphors. 
At the same time, I may seem to be advocating a strongly Whorfian position on the relationship 
between language and thought: that is, that the structure of the Latin language, including its 
metaphorical structure, determines (in the sense of “limits”) its speakers’ possible ways of 
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conceiving and thus also of representing experience. Though such a position would not be entirely 
indefensible—experimental studies have shown that the grammatical structure of a language can, 
in certain circumstances, influence thought and even perception—this is not in fact the argument 
I am making.45 My claim, instead, is that the vertical and horizontal metaphors very clearly 
recognizable in Latin speakers’ talk about time operated in Roman society at the level of shared 
conceptualization—in a word, at the level of culture—and as such provided “ready-made” models 
of understanding capable of delivering certain schematic images and thus certain meanings 
through language as well as through other forms of symbolic representation. In other words, in my 
view, the metaphorically structured conceptualizations that Latin speakers have of time are prior 
to their encodings in any particular verbal, visual, or behavioral form. If the forms of the patrician 
stemma and funeral procession make sense to Latin speakers, it is because they are maximally 
coherent with conceptualizations that also motivate conventional patterns of speech in Latin, not 
because they depend on these linguistic patterns. 
From this perspective, it is interesting to compare Latin’s LINEAR metaphors of time with ways 
of expressing temporal relations in Greek. As examples (55) through (63) reveal, Greek speakers 
sometimes talk about times of day, seasons, years, or periods of life as “coming” or “approaching” 
towards a person:  
(55) είς ὅ κεν ἔλθῃ νύξ, “When night came” (Hom. Il. 14.77); 
(56) νὺξ ἐπῄει, “Night was coming” (Aesch. Pers. 378); 
(57) πρὶν δωδεκάτη μόλῃ ἠώς, “Before the twelfth dawn comes” (Hom. Il. 24.781); 
(58) μέμβλωκε μάλιστα ἦμαρ, “The day has almost passed” (Od. 17.190). 
(59) ἐπήλυθον ὧραι, “The seasons came” (2.107); 
(60) χειμὼν ἐπιών, “Winter coming” (Hes. WD. 675); 
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(61) ἐπὴν ἔλθῃσι θέρος, “When summer came” (Hom. Od. 11.192); 
(62) ἐννέα δὴ βεβάασι . . . ἐνιαυτοί,, “Nine years . . . have gone” (Il. 2.134); 
(63) είς ὅ κε γῆρας / ἔλθῃ καὶ θάνατος, “When old age and death come” (13.59‒60); 
Examples (64) to (68) show that they can also talk about a subject as “arriving at” or “coming to” 
particular times: 
(64) οὐκ ἄν τις τούτων γε ἐΰθρονον Ἠῶ ἵκοιτο, “Not any one of these shall arrive at 
well-throned dawn” (Hom. Od. 17.497); 
(65) ἥβης . . . ἵκετο μέτρον, “He arrived at the measure of youth” (Il. 11.225); 
(66) οὐδ’ ἵκετο γήραος οὐδόν, “He did not reach the threshold of old age” (Od. 15.246); 
(67) οὐδ’ ἐπὶ γῆρας / ἵκετ’ ἐνὶ μεγάροισι, “He did not reach old age in the palace” (8.226‒
27); 
(68) οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὅσοι ἐνταῦθα ἦλθον ἡλικίας, “All the others who have reached this 
time of life” (Plat. Rep. 329b); 
This indicates Greek largely shared Latin’s horizontal metaphor in both its “time-moving” and 
“ego-moving” variations.46 This is why it is possible to find expressions such as διαλιπούσης δ’ 
ἡμέρας μάχη αὖθις γίγνεται (“The battle began again after a day’s interval,” literally, “after a day 
had left behind”: Thuc. Hist. 3.74.1) alongside those like ἐπειδὰν τὰ τριάκοντα ἔτη ἐκβαίνωσιν 
(“when they are more than thirty years old,” literally, “when they depart from thirty years”: Plat. 
Rep. 537d). Furthermore, as Silvia Luraghi has shown, the Greek preposition πρό can signify 
temporal anteriority (as in, e.g., ἠῶθι πρό “before daybreak” or πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου “before dying”) 
through figurative extension of its literal spatial sense of “in front of,” while μετά, literally 
“behind,” can signify temporal posteriority (as in μετὰ ταῦτα, “afterwards” or μετὰ τρεῖς ἡμέρας 
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“after three days”), indicating Greek included a time-oriented image as well, even if it appears 
somewhat more restricted than Latin’s.47 
Traces of a vertical metaphor of time are also detectable in Greek, though words denoting “up” 
and “down,” “above” and “below,” or “high” and “low” do not appear to have been employed of 
temporal relations with the same regularity, or in the same neat conceptual opposition, as in Latin. 
For instance, ἄνω (“upwards”) and ἐπάνω (“above”) can sometimes have the sense of “before,” 
but this usage is limited mainly to the language of Plato and, later, Demosthenes, and Polybius.48 
Furthermore, a word like ἄκρος, “high(est)” may be used in certain (mostly poetic) contexts in the 
sense of “early”—as in, for example, ἄκρᾳ σὺν ἑσπέρᾳ, “in the early evening” (Pind. Pyth. 11.10) 
or ἄκρου τοῦ ἔαρος, “in early spring” (IPE 12.352.29)—but more usually it denotes a temporal 
midpoint, as in ἄκρου τοῦ θέρεος, “in midsummer” (Hipp. Aphor. 3.18) or ἄκρας νυκτός, “in the 
middle of the night” (Soph. Aj. 285). Likewise, κάτω (“downwards”) and κάτωθεν (“below”) can 
be found in the sense of “after”—for instance, in Plato’s τοὺς εἰς τὸ κάτωθεν, “those of a later 
period” (Tim. 18d)—but this usage is infrequent before the Roman era and its increasing 
appearance in authors like Aelian and Plutarch likely indicates influence from Latin. And 
κατώτερος (“lower”) may sometimes mean “younger” (as in Call. Cer. 130, αἵτινες ἑξήκοντα 
κατώτεραι, “as many as are younger than sixty”), but other words with similar spatial meanings—
e.g., νέ(ι)ατος, νειρός, ταπεινός—are probably never found with temporal significations (the 
connection of νεί- < IE *ni “(be)low” with νέος “new, young” is spurious).49 “Upwards” (ἄνω) 
can also be found referring to the future, as it in Lucian’s τί δέ με ἀδικήσαντα τοσοῦτον εἴας ἄνω 
τὸν χρόνον; “What did I do wrong that you were permitting me so long a life?” (literally, “so much 
up time”) (Cat. 7.6). 
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Greek and Latin’s LINEAR metaphors of time only partially overlap, then. If Latin speakers 
made ready use of “up” and “down,” “above” and “below,” “high” and “low” in conceptualizing 
temporal relations, the image of a vertical line does not appear to have afforded the Greek 
imagination the same coherent metaphor for these purposes. The difference seems more than a 
linguistic curiosity, however. Given Greek speakers’ lack of any systematic vertical metaphor of 
time and thus of any symbolic motivation, as part of their culture, for representing the temporal 
ordering of generations in these terms, it cannot appear coincidental that Greek society’s principal 
model of family relations—the ὰγχιστεία—envisioned the group of “close kin” as composed 
almost exclusively of contemporary “horizontal” ties.50 Or that family genealogies, when they 
were kept, typically took the form of lists or narratives similar to the catalogues of Homeric epic, 
preserved orally or in writing, but were never represented in any material, artifactual form similar 
to the Roman stemma.51 Athenian notions of autochthony, according to which what comes “before” 
is “below” and what comes “after” is “above,” in fact appear to presuppose a model of temporal 
relations that fully inverts the stemma’s vertical scale.52 This suggests that Greek’s conceptual 
system, without any consistent spatialization of time in terms of “above” and “below,” did not 
commit its speakers to any particular organization of temporality along the vertical axis. 
To be clear. I am not suggesting that the stemma would have been incomprehensible to Greek 
speakers. Even if a vertical metaphor of time was marginal in their conceptual system, its 
availability nevertheless implies Greek speakers could easily have intuited the stemma’s meaning, 
even if its form would not have appeared particularly salient. On the other hand, it is hard to 
imagine what sense Roman representations of kinship would have made to speakers of Aymara, 
who conceptualize time as a static physical landscape where the future is behind the speaker and 
the past is in front of the speaker—saying, for instance, qhipa mara, literally “back year,” for “next 
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year” and nayra mara, literally, “front year,” for “last year” and gesturing accordingly.53 Or for 
that matter to speakers of the Australian language Kuuk Thaayorre, which expresses spatial 
relations in terms of absolute cardinal directionality (so, to say that something is in front of you, 
you say it is to the north, if facing north; to the east, if facing east, and so on). Though spatial 
words are not regularly used metaphorically of time in this language, its speakers nevertheless 
appear to conceptualize temporal relations according to this system. When asked to place pictures 
depicting some sequence of actions in temporal order, for example, they consistently arrange 
earlier images towards the east and later images towards the west (regardless of the direction they 
are facing), obviously on the model of the sun’s path through the sky during the course of a day.54 
Latin’s vertical and horizontal images of time—each with its more allocentric or more 
egocentric construal of temporal relations—in fact appear to automatically structure how Latin 
speakers go about representing temporal relations to themselves in their symbolic expression. 
Consider the farmers’ almanac stone from Rome (1st c. CE) or for that matter the fragmentary 
wall-calendar from Antium (84‒55 BCE), reproduced in Figures 5 and 6.<FIGURE 5: Farmers’ 
almanac stone. Rome, 1st c. CE = ILS 8745.><FIGURE 6: Fasti Antiates Maiores. Antium, 84‒55 
BCE.> Both represent the order of the months of the year along the horizontal axis and the order 
of days within each month (the most religiously important ones, at any rate) along the vertical axis. 
The selection of the horizontal axis for representing the division of the year into months and of the 
vertical axis for the division of each month into days is very likely conditioned again by the “main 
meaning focus” of each metaphor. The horizontal axis is preferred for the months of the year 
because the position of each month in the annual sequence is a matter of more subject-specific 
relations: February follows January, March follows February, and so forth. The months are (more) 
“egocentric” in the sense that they are specifically named, each constituting a distinct subjectivity 
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within a determined ordering. Indeed, in Roman culture the months are very often 
anthropomorphized and thus have a definite “facing”:55 this is why Janus, who ends the old year 
and begins the new year, is represented as looking in two directions, both forward and backward 
along the horizontal time line.56 The vertical axis is instead preferred for the days of the months 
because the ordering of the days within the month is more allocentric, in the sense that, particularly 
in the Fasti, the same pattern repeats itself without significant differentiation for each of the months 
(the relations between the days of the months being a feature of the system as a whole) and that, 
with the well-known exceptions of the Kalends, Nones, and Ides, they do not have an articulated 
nomenclature. The days of the month have a specific numerical ordering (e.g., ante diem tertium, 
quartum, quintum Nonas Ianuarias), but are subject-neutral—they do not “face” one another. 
Or take the marble relief from Amiternum shown in Figure 7.<FIGURE 7: Marble relief 
depicting a funerary procession. Amiternum, c. 50 BCE. Now in the Museo Nazionale d’Abruzzo, 
L’Aquila.> It depicts a funeral procession: at right are the musicians who lead the parade, farther 
to the left is the deceased’s bier, and finally at the far left his bereaved descendants. Time thus 
unfolds along a horizontal axis from right to left, “right” being before and “left” after (in projecting 
the image to two-dimensional space, Roman culture appears largely neutral as to the lateral 
directionality of the time line). At the same time, the relief’s vertical registers appear to define an 
additional temporal scale, at least in part. Though the scenes of mourning on the left presumably 
take place simultaneously to the procession and so demonstrate no temporal distinction between 
registers, the parade of musicians on the right extends over two registers clearly differentiated 
temporally. The horn-blowers and trumpeter at top represent those who come first in line, while 
the pipers at bottom are following. Time thus also runs vertically with before “above” and after 
“below.” Again, however, even taking into account the particular (not to say peculiar) constraints 
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placed on representations of time and space in ancient forms of art,57 the horizontal and vertical 
axes appear to differ in their meaning focus. As with the lived pompa funebris, selection of the 
horizontal axis to represent the deceased’s position within the order of generations is likely 
motivated by the more subject-specific character of the horizontal metaphor time; the vertical axis 
is chosen to represent temporal relations detached from this perspective because of vertical time’s 
more subject-neutral framing.58 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS. 
In this paper, I have argued that certain patterns of figurative meaning in Latin’s expressions of 
time are also recognizable in Roman society’s symbolic activities more broadly. Specifically, I 
argued that Latin speakers’ conceptualization of time is structured metaphorically (in part) by 
image schemas of linear spatial relations, and suggested that the understanding of temporal 
relations delivered by these metaphors differs in at least one respect: namely, that the vertical image 
of time construes the ordering of times allocentrically (without reference to any subject), whereas 
through the horizontal image construes this ordering egocentrically (always relative to a 
viewpoint). I then indicated a number of contexts in which each metaphor’s main meaning focus 
appears to motivate the specific axial arrangements of visual representations. 
These have only been hints. Nevertheless, as patterns of meaning whose organizing effects are 
detectable widely over Roman society’s symbolic expression, the interest of these metaphors 
seems to go beyond claims as to their universality. In structuring a significant portion of Latin 
speakers’ conventional talk about time, as well as providing a regular model for the topographical 
distribution of temporally related events in visual space, they appear to constitute an important 
“theme” of Roman cultural representation. Indeed, if Latin speakers’ everyday talk, ritualized 
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behaviors, and interaction with objects in even seemingly unrelated areas of life—kinship 
practices, calendar making, the visual arts—all embodied the same metaphorical structuring of 
time in linear spatial terms, this would have contributed to a perception of these activities as 
coming together under a cohesive signifying order. Topography, too, would have corroborated this 
perception, as the urban environment itself seems to have afforded a context of lived experienced 
perfectly recapitulating this metaphorical structure. Climbing the Palatine Hill to where Romulus’ 
hut could be seen, or the Capitoline Hill to where the arx and other monuments of the city’s earliest 
history stood, a Latin speaker would have appreciated ‘BEFORE IS ABOVE’ as a feature of the 
landscape. Similarly, walking from, say, the temple of Mars Ultor through the porticoes of the 
Forum of Augustus, where statues of the Julian family and of Rome’s summi viri were displayed 
chronologically earliest to last, a Latin speaker would have recognized ‘AFTER IS IN FRONT OF 
(EGO)’ as something literally true of the world. 
The sorts of conclusions that can be drawn about Latin’s time metaphors specifically imply that 
attending to the image-schematic and metaphorical structuring of concepts generally can offer 
benefits to classical studies. First, it offers teachers of the classical languages a framework for 
explaining and thus making more readily comprehensible to students the meanings of idioms in 
Latin and Greek. When seemingly semantically opaque idiomatic expressions can be 
contextualized within pervasive metaphorical themes, the meanings of those idioms should 
become reasonable and inferable and therefore easier to learn: As Susan Irujo argues, “Teaching 
students strategies for dealing with figurative language will help them to take advantage of the 
semantic transparency of some idioms. If they can figure out the meaning of an idiom by 
themselves, they will have a link from the idiomatic meaning to the literal words, which will help 
them learn the idiom.”59 By giving students linguistic and cultural knowledge that helps them to 
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reason metaphorically “in the native’s own terms” (that is, to think the way a Roman might have 
thought), this approach may actually enable students to make the kind of contextually-dependent 
predictions of meaning that are necessary for understanding not only the grammatical and lexical 
cohesion of texts but also their coherence with (and within) the cultural system.60 
Second, it affords the possibility of taking a more “emic” perspective in our analyses of the 
Latin language and of Roman literature. An emic perspective, as we know, privileges “native” 
ways of knowing and of representing the world, rather than concepts belonging to the observer’s 
own intellectual framework.61 By illustrating how even demonstrably human-universal patterns of 
conceptualization can come to be articulated in idiosyncratic ways across the creative expression 
of a particular “languaculture” (to use Michael Agar’s handy portmanteau),62 a metaphor-based 
approach promises to reveal the sorts of symbolic “themes” or “macrosignifieds” that go toward 
making up a society’s distinctive repertoire of meanings: in a word, its culture. Certainly, 
anthropology has long been interested in the thematicity of culture, from Ruth Benedict’s 
definition of culture as “personality writ large,” to Clyde Kluckhohn’s concept of “configurations,” 
to Claude Lévi-Strauss’ “cultural axioms,” and Clifford Geertz’s “cultural templates.” Yet an 
awareness that metaphor is probably the form of symbolic representation most directly revealing 
of this aspect of culture is only now congealing as part of the “cognitive revolution” taking place 
in the social sciences and humanities. Especially when combined with a culturally-comparative 
perspective, a metaphor-based approach can highlight how the images through which Latin 
speakers’ “capture” their concepts may be based on experiences shared by presumably all human 
beings, their privileging of certain experiences in metaphorical conceptualization constitutes a 
distinctive feature of their signifying order. 
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More generally, it suggests the possibility of helping to bridge the gap between the interpretation 
of texts on the one hand and works of art and architecture on the other. In treating metaphor as a 
matter of conceptualization, it takes as granted that the same figurative relationships shaping forms 
of linguistic expression will be manifest also in the alimentary, vestimentary, gestural, and kinesic 
codes underlying social behavior, as well as in the aesthetic codes that underpin material culture. 
Of course, by “same” I do not mean that the visual code should be treated as merely a calque on 
the linguistic. It is possible to take Hölscher’s metaphor too literally. The point is not to seek some 
kind of one-to-one correspondence between certain rhetorical figures of speech and visual 
configurations, or between certain strategies of literary description (even in terms of favored 
syntactic constructions) and motifs of artistic composition. In a cognitivist perspective, all 
representational modalities are grounded in the same conceptual structures (including 
metaphorical ones) and guided by the same cognitive processes of meaning making. The point, 
then, is to discover how language and art, as distinct forms of representation each with its own 
standards of signification, convey the repertoire of shared meanings (including metaphorical 
meanings) that constitute a society’s signifying order: in a word, its culture. A metaphor-based 
approach therefore lends itself very well to bringing together a cognitive archaeology and a 
cognitive linguistics under a unified method capable of delineating a distinctively Roman way of 
having the world.64 
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